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The objective arbitrability, which determines the range of arbitrable disputes, is 
set up by mandatory substantive, material rules of private international law. The 
comparison of different national arbitration laws shows that, mutatis mutandis, 
the mostly mentioned arbitrability is extended not only to pecuniary claims but 
also to non-pecuniary claims if parties are capable of concluding a settlement on 
the matter in dispute.
The critical issue in international arbitration, which may arise at different 
stages of arbitral and court proceedings, is to determine the applicable law that 
governs such arbitrability. The author, upon analyses of selected national laws, 
case law and the New York Convention, concludes that both arbitral tribunal 
and national courts, have to determine objective arbitrability according to the 
rules of lex fori.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ISSUES
Both subjective and objective arbitrability are conditions of the validity of the 
arbitration agreement. Our analysis is focused only on the objective arbitrability 
which determines the range of arbitrable disputes, i.e., determines generally 
which disputes can be submitted to arbitration, including disputes on intellec-
tual property rights. Arbitrability restricts the autonomy of the parties. In the 
Swiss case law, arbitrability is deﬁ ned as a quality of the subject of the dispute, 
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une condition de validité de la convention d’ arbitrage.1 This concept has to be dis-
tinguished from the scope of the arbitration agreement, i.e., from the question 
of which disputes fall within the terms of particular arbitration agreements.
In the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
of 1985 (hereinafter: Model Law) there is neither a deﬁ nition nor a provision 
on arbitrability, as the drafters could not reach consensus. However, Article 
1(5) of the Model Law permits each implementing state to exclude from its 
scope of application all disputes which are not, in that state, capable of being 
submitted to arbitration, or are arbitrable only according to provisions other 
than those of the Model Law. Thus, it is up to the national arbitration laws to 
set criteria for arbitrability of disputes.
In comparative arbitration law there are different approaches to determining 
arbitrability. Most often, they directly consider the characteristics of claims, 
an approach which could be labelled as arbitrability ratione materiae. In addi-
tion, arbitrability limits are sometimes set by considering whether a court or 
administrative body has exclusive jurisdiction over a matter - arbitrability ratione 
jurisdictionis. If a law provides for exclusive jurisdiction over certain kinds of 
disputes, they are not arbitrable.
According to some modern laws, arbitrability is extended to all pecuniary 
claims (cause de nature patrimoniale; vermögensrechtlicher Anspruch; pretesa patri-
moniale) - e.g., Article 177(1) of the Swiss Statute on PIL, Article 1030(1) of 
the German ZPO and Article 582(1) of the Austrian Code on Civil Procedure. 
According to the last two mentioned laws, non-pecuniary claims are arbitrable 
as well, if parties are capable of concluding a settlement upon the matter in 
dispute. These laws are an example of how a general tendency in both statutory 
and case law can enlarge the range of arbitrable disputes in such a manner.
Returning to Article 177(1) of the Swiss Statute on PIL, it is a widely ac-
cepted view that both its rules regarding probate proceedings and inheritance 
litigation on immovable property, immovable property disputes and consumer 
contracts, and some provisions of the Swiss Civil Code providing mandatory 
fora are not binding on the question of arbitrability.2
Other legislation, case law, and commentary provide variations on the crite-
ria for arbitrability. Matters considered arbitrable include, under Chinese law, 
1 Decision of the Swiss Federal Court of 23 June 1992 - DFT 118 II 353 ad 3a. 
2 More about it, Briner, in: Berty(ed.) International Arbitration in Switzerland, 320 et seq. 
(2000).
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contractual disputes and other disputes over rights and interests in property;3 
under Bulgarian law, civil property disputes;4 under Russian law, disputes arising 
from contractual and other civil-law relations in foreign trade and other types 
of international economic relationships;5 and under Spanish law, disputes relat-
ing to matters within free disposition (libre disposition) of the parties.6 Swedish 
and Hungarian law provide that matters in respect of which the parties may 
reach a settlement are arbitrable;7 Croatian law provides that matters regarding 
rights of which parties may freely dispose are arbitrable8; arbitrable disputes 
include not only disputes regarding pecuniary claims, but also those non-pe-
cuniary claims in respect of which parties may reach a settlement (Vergleich), 
i.e., conclude such a private law contract deﬁ ned by the law governing such 
a contract. In Croatian law, it is governed by Articles 150 et seq. of the 2005 
Croatian Law on Obligation. In Article 1020(3) of the Dutch Arbitration Law, 
it is provided that the arbitration agreement shall not serve to determine the 
legal consequences which parties cannot freely dispose of.
Some commentators have expressed the opinion that the formulations ‘rights 
of which parties may freely dispose’ and ‘claims in respect of which parties 
may reach a settlement’ are synonymous.’9 I am also of this opinion. However, 
there is a difference between the criterion of ‘the pecuniary nature of the dis-
pute’ and that of ‘the possibility of free disposition of a right.’ The former is 
a mandatory and well-deﬁ ned substantive rule that avoids the difﬁ culties of a 
conﬂ ict of law approach, whereas the latter determines arbitrability by applying 
the lex causae, i.e. the law governing the rights in casu. Expressed otherwise, the 
latter criterion would presuppose a conﬂ ict of law solution, since the deﬁ nition 
3 See Article 2 the Chinese Arbitration Law of 1994. In this Law there are speciﬁ c provi-
sion on disputes which may not be arbitrated; these are disputes on the status of physi-
cal persons - marital, adoption, guardianship, support and succesion and administrative 
diputes (Article 3).
4 Article 1(2) of the Bulgarian Law on International Commercial Arbitration.
5 Article 1(2) of the Russian Arbitration Act.
6 Article 2(1) of the Spanish Law on Arbitration.
7 Article 1 of the Swedish Arbitration Act, Article 4 of the Hungarian Law on Arbitra-
tion.
8 Article 3(1) of the Croatian Arbitration Act.
9 For such views in comparative law, compare, Triva/Uzelac, Hrvatsko arbitraæno pravo 
(Croatian Arbitration Law), 18 et seq. (2007); Sajko, Meunarodno privatno pravo (Pri-
vate International Law), 306 et seq (5th ed.2009). 
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of a legal relationship submitted to arbitration requires an examination of the 
substantive law applicable to it.10
There are provisions in several arbitration laws on the exclusive jurisdiction of 
courts and/or administrative authorities as an obstacle to arbitrability. Pursuant 
to Article 5(1) of the Serbian Arbitration Law, pecuniary claims cannot be set-
tled by arbitration if they are submitted to the exclusive courts jurisdiction, and 
Article 1030(2) and (3) of the German ZPO contains an exception to the general 
principle of arbitrability for matters over which a court has exclusive jurisdiction, 
such as disputes regarding leases for residential accommodation and employment 
contracts. Article 4 of the Hungarian law also contains an explicit exception to 
arbitrability for matters over which a court has exclusive jurisdiction. Such rules 
preserve a state monopoly over resolving some speciﬁ c types of disputes. 
According to Article 3(2) of the Croatian Arbitration Act, exclusive Croatian 
court jurisdiction is an obstacle for arbitrability only for arbitration that takes 
place in a foreign country,11 and has no importance in determining (2009) the 
arbitrability of the same types of disputes when the arbitration takes place in 
Croatia. Such a limitation on arbitrability cannot be productive, and its aim 
- to hinder arbitration abroad - cannot always be successfully sanctioned. Let 
us illustrate this assertion by considering the following hypothetical case. The 
parties, a Croatian company and a Belgium company, have concluded, under 
the Vienna Rules, an arbitration agreement on settlement of disputes arising 
from a contract regarding immovable property in Croatia; the designated loca-
tion of arbitration is Vienna. The arbitral proceedings have been terminated by 
the rendering of the award. If recognition and enforcement of such an award 
were to be sought in Germany, it would be granted under conditions set in the 
New York Convention of 1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards - furthermore: the New York Convention (Article 1061 of the 
German ZPO). With regard to the arbitrability issue, Article V(2)(a) of the 
New York Convention provides the application of lex fori; thus, in casu German 
law would be applicable.12 In the same case, the above-mentioned Croatian 
10 Compare, Podret/Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, n.332 et seq. (2nd 
ed. 2007); see also Swiss Federal Court, June 23, 1992 - ATF 118 II, 353 et seq.; English 
translation, Yearbook Comm. Arb’n, XX, 766 et seq.(1995). 
11 For more about this issue, see Sajko, Das neue kroatische Recht der Schiedsgerichtsbar-
keit, in: Razprawy pravnicze Pazdan (Festschrift Pazdan), 487 et seq.(2005). 
12 Of course, the lex fori for determining of the dispute arbitrability would be applied in all 
member states of the New York Convention when recognition and enforcement of the 
mentioned Austrian arbitral award would be sought there.
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rule on arbitrability would be applied, also in accordance with the cited rule 
of the above-mentioned Convention, only if the recognition and enforcement 
of that award were to be sought in Croatia.
Under Article 1(2)(d) of the Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
No. 44/2001 arbitration is outside the scope of this Community instrument. 
However, as in proceedings which are, i.a., concerned with registration or validity 
of patents, trade marks, design or other similar rights required to be deposited 
or registered, Article 22(4) of that Regulation provides for exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the Member state in which the deposit or registration 
has been applied for, that Article’s impact on arbitrability has to be examined, 
i.e., whether Article 22 (4) constitutes a barrier to arbitrability in such cases. 
13 Without entering into all details on the scope of application of this rule, let 
me give a brief overview of these issues.
The exclusive jurisdiction embraces disputes regarding the proceedings on 
registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or similar rights required 
to be registered or deposited.14 By contrast, disputes regarding intellectual 
property rights arising from contracts are not within this exclusive jurisdic-
tion.15 Neither are claims for infringement of such rights;16 claims on granting, 
revocation or remuneration of compulsory licenses; infringement of rights 
where the defendant raises invalidity as a defence; or claims for a declaration 
on non-infringement where the author alleges invalidity of the rights.17 
 Is an arbitrator sitting in country X required to take into account foreign 
legal restrictions on arbitrability, e.g., of the law of the probable place of enforce-
ment of the arbitral award? In Swiss commentary it is argued that the answer 
has to be positive, if such foreign restrictions qualify as loi de police international 
or loi d’ application immédiate. However, in the Fincantieri case, decided in 1992, 
13 Such exclusive jurisdiction was already provided for in Article 16(4) or the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions, but the above-mentioned Regulation formulation embraced, in 
addition, the rights whose register is regulated by a Community instrument. 
14 See ECJ Case C-288/82, Ferdinand Duijnstee v. Lodewijk Goderbauer, (1983) ECR 3663,3676 
para 19. Cf., i.a., Magnus/Mankowski (ed.), Brussels I Regulation, Article 22, n. 63 et seq. 
(2007).
15 See, e.g., Fawcett/Torremans, Intellectual property and Private International Law 19 et 
seq. (1998); ECJ, November 15, 1983, Case 288/82, ECR 3663, 367 sec. 28.
16 See Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht, Article 22, n. 50 (5th ed., 2004).
17 For all details as regards the case law of the European Court and legal writing, see supra 
note 14, at n. 64 et seq.
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the Swiss Federal Tribunal held that arbitrability may not be denied for the 
sole reason that mandatory provisions or another legal system imply that the 
claim which is raised is invalid or impossible to enforce.18
2. APPLICABLE LAW FOR ARBITRABILITY
The rules on arbitrability analyzed above are substantive, material rules of 
private international law (règle materielle) and not conﬂ ict of law provisions. 
The critical issue in international arbitration is to determine the applicable law 
that governs such arbitrability. That issue may arise at different stages of the 
proceedings: before the arbitral tribunal; before a court from whom the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreement is sought; before a court that decides whether 
an award will be set aside; and ﬁ nally, before a court from which enforcement 
of an award is requested.
As an arbitral tribunal is bound to apply mandatory provisions of the lex 
arbitri of the place of arbitration, it has to respect the provisions on arbitrability 
of that state, and examine them without a motion by the parties. Such applica-
ble law for arbitrability i.e., lex fori, has to be inferred from Article 15(1) of the 
Croatian Arbitration Law, and is widely accepted in comparative arbitration law, 
case law and legal writing.19 However, as we have already pointed out above, 
one must distinguish between two different criteria of arbitrability: the pecuniary 
nature of the dispute and the possibility to dispose of rights. The former criterion is 
a substantive law rule, and the latter refers, for determination of arbitrability, 
to the law governing rights in casu, i.e., to lex causae of such rights.20
18 Afﬁ rmative, Bucher/Bonomi, Droit international privé, 323 (2001). On this issue com-
pare deliberation of Schnyder, Rechtskollision durch Verfahrenskollision - Herausfor-
derung für die internationale Schiedsbarkeit der Schweiz, in: Rechtskollisionen, Fest-
schrift Heini, 376 et seq. (1995). Swiss Federal Tribunal - ATF II 118, 353. However, 
in this case the problem was not of determination of arbitrability ratione materiae, but 
ratione personae.
19 For the Croatian law, see, Sajko, o.c., supra note 9, at 306 et seq. ; see ICC case no. 4604 
in Arnaldez/Derain/Hascher, ICC Awards 1986-1990, 545; further ICC case no 6149, in 
Yearbook Comm.Arb’n, XX, 41 et seq. (1995); Lew/Mistelis/Kroll, Comparative Iinter-
national Commercial Arbitration, n. 9-29 et seq. (2003).
20 Compare, Bucher, Le novel arbitrage international en Suisse - as to application of lex 
causae, if the criterion is possibility to dispose of rights - ‘Il convient donc de se reférer a la 
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Another approach, under which the issue of arbitrability before the arbitral 
tribunal has to be decided according to the law chosen by the parties to the 
arbitration agreement,21 in my opinion should not be accepted, as it does not 
take into account that the rule on the arbitrability of lex arbitri is stringent and 
that it aims to restrict the autonomy of the parties. 
What about the application of the governing law on arbitrability by the 
courts that have jurisdiction over the setting aside of arbitral awards or over 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign awards? 
As the courts are bound to all mandatory rules of their lex fori, they also 
have to apply their rules on arbitrability that are set forth in their respective 
arbitration laws or in international conventions dealing with this subject mat-
ter. For the stage of setting aside of arbitral awards, such a solution is explicitly 
provided in many national arbitration laws - Article 36(2)(a) of the Croatian 
Arbitration Law, Article 1059(2) (a) of the German ZPO, just to mention a 
few of the many examples - and it is very widely accepted.
As regards the enforcement stage, the application of lex fori is provided by 
Article V(2)(a) of the New York Convention. 
In my opinion, the same method of determination of applicable law must 
be adopted when applying Article II (3) of the New York Convention, which 
provides - when a court is seized of an action in a matter in respect to which 
parties have made an arbitration agreement - that jurisdiction must be denied if 
the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed. Although in this Convention rule there are no indications on applicable 
law, the Italian courts,22 the Belgium Cour de cassation23 and the U.S. Supreme 
Court24 have applied its lex fori. Such an approach is a logical consequence of the 
courts’ obligations to apply in all proceedings the stringent rules on arbitrability, 
loi applicable au fond du litige, loi qui est determinée conformément aux règles de droit 
international privé appliquées par le tribunal arbitral’, n. 88 (1988). 
21 See more about such solutions, e.g., Chukwumerije, Choice of Law in International Com-
mercial Arbitration 54 et seq. (1994).
22 Corte di cassazione, April 27, 1979, Yearbook Comm.Arb’n, VI, 229 et seq.(1981), 
followed by the decisions of Bologna Court of ﬁ rst instance, July 18, 1987, Yearbook 
Comm.Arb’n, XVII, 534 et seq. (1992) and of Genova Court of Appeal, February 3, 
1990, Yearbook Comm.Arb’n, XVII, 542 et seq. (1992).
23 More about this recent decision, Poudret/Besson, supra note 10, at n. 335.
24 Mitsubishi v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth - U.S. Supreme Court, July 2, 1985, 105 SCR 
(1985), Yearbook Comm.Arb’ n, XI, 555 et seq. (1986). 
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thus not only at the stage of award enforcement, which is explicitly provided in 
Article V(2) (a) of the New York Convention, but also at the pre-award stage 
i.e., within the framework of Article II(3) of that Convention. This is because, 
although Article II and V of the Convention concern two different aspects of 
arbitral proceedings, they require the same interpretation.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The objective arbitrability, which determines the range of arbitrable disputes, 
is set up by mandatory substantive, material rules of private international law. 
The comparisons of different national arbitration laws shows that, mutatis 
mutandis, mostly mentioned arbitrability is extended not only to pecuniary 
claims but also to non-pecuniary claims if parties are capable to conclude a 
settlement upon the matter of the dispute.
The critical issue in international arbitration, which may arise at different 
stages of arbitral and court proceedings, is to determine the applicable law 
that governs such arbitrability. Upon analyses of selected national laws, case 
law and the New York Convention, it could be concluded that both arbitral 
tribunal and national courts, determine objective arbitrability according to 
the rules of lex fori.
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DIE SCHIEDSFÄHIGKEIT IM RECHTSVERGLEICH - EIN ABRISS
Die objektive Schiedsfähigkeit bestimmt, welche Streitigkeiten einem Schiedsverfahren 
unterworfen werden können. Sie ist durch zwingende materielle Vorschriften des Inter-
nationalen Privatrechts geregelt. Der Vergleich verschiedener nationaler Schiedsrechte 
zeigt, dass sich Schiedsfähigkeit nicht nur auf geldliche, sondern auch auf nichtgeldliche 
Streitigkeiten beziehen kann, die sich für einen Vergleich eignen.
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Die Analyse auserwählter nationaler Rechtsordnungen, Rechtsprechungen und 
Schiedssprüche sowie des New Yorker Schiedsübereinkommens legt den Schluss nahe, dass 
die Schiedsgerichte und die ordentlichen Gerichte die objektive Schiedsfähigkeit durch 
Anwendung der lex fori festlegen. 
Schlüsselwörter: internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit; objektive Schiedsfähigkeit; 
zwingende materielle Vorschriften zur Schiedsfähigkeit; maßgebliches Recht zur Schieds-
fähigkeit; lex fori als maßgebliches Recht für die objektive Schiedsfähigkeit 
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O ARBITRABILNOSTI U KOMPARATIVNOJ ARBITRAÆI 
- NEKE NAPOMENE
Objektivna arbitrabilnost odreuje koji se sporovi mogu podvrgnuti arbitraænom 
rjeπavanju, a utvrena je prinudnim materijalnim pravilima meunarodnog privatnog 
prava. Poredba razliËitih nacionalnih arbitraænih prava upuÊuje na to da se ta arbi-
trabilnost ne odnosi samo na novËane sporove veÊ i na nenovËane ako se o njima moæe 
zakljuËiti nagodba.
Na osnovi analize izabranih nacionalnih prava, sudske i arbitraæne prakse te 
Newyorπke konvencije nameÊe se zakljuËak da arbitraæni i nacionalni sudovi utvruje 
objektivnu arbitrabilnost primjenom legis fori.
KljuËne rijeËi: meunarodna abitraæa; objektivna arbitrabilnost; obvezna materijalna 
pravila o arbitrabilnosti; mjerodavno pravo za arbitrabilnost; lex fori kao mjerodavno 
pravo za objektivnu arbitrabilnost 
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